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dicate	 the	 intrinsic	 value	of	 truth	 in	 terms	of	 its	 instrumental	 value,	
thereby	 entrenching	 himself	 squarely	 in	 the	 traditional	 territory	 of	
indirect	utilitarianism.	What	is	more,	he	proposes	to	do	so	using	the	
method	of	genealogy,	which	suggests	a	historical	approach	—	but	he	
also	denies	 that	 the	concept	of	 truth	has	a	history,	and	prefaces	his	
historical	 remarks	 with	 an	 avowedly	 fictional	 state-of-nature	 story.	
Unsurprisingly,	 this	has	 raised	questions.	What	 separates	Williams’s	
instrumental	 vindication	 from	 indirect	utilitarianism?1	And	how	can	
genealogy	 vindicate	 anything,	 let	 alone	 something	 which	 does	 not	




modernism	which	 soon	 appeared	 to	be	 already	on	 the	wane.	But	 a	
decade	and	a	half	later,	the	advent	of	“post-truth”	politics	vindicated	







2.	 Nagel	 (2009,	 134)	 expresses	 puzzlement	 over	 the	 project	 of	 vindicating	
through	genealogy.	Koopman	(2013,	20,	64–5,	74,	87)	even	charges	Williams	
with	committing	 the	genetic	 fallacy.	McGinn	(2003)	finds	 the	genealogical	
story	 redundant,	 given	 that	 instrumental	 considerations	 are	 supposed	 to	
vindicate.	Rorty	(2002)	confesses	himself	unable	to	see	the	relation	between	
the	fictional	and	the	historical	parts	of	the	book.	In	general,	what	exactly	the	
book’s	 “circuitous”	 (Elgin	2005,	343)	argument	 is	 supposed	 to	be	has	been	
contested.	 Reactions	 have	 ranged	 from	 hailing	 it	 as	 “the	most	 interesting	
set	of	 reflections	on	 the	values	of	 truth	and	 truth-telling	 in	 living	memory”	









raised	by	Colin	McGinn	as	a	 foil,	 I	 show	 in	what	 sense	an	 intrinsic	
value	 can	 be	 vindicated	 through	 pragmatic	 genealogy.	 I	 distinguish	
this	 type	of	vindication	from	indirect	utilitarianism,	and	I	argue	that	
Williams	 is	 concerned	with	a	 form	of	 self-effacing	 functionality	 that	
genealogy	 is	uniquely	 suited	 to	dealing	with.	 I	 conclude	with	an	as-
sessment	of	the	wider	significance	of	Williams’s	genealogy	both	for	his	
own	oeuvre	and	for	further	genealogical	inquiry.




della verità.5	Others	urge	that	it	is	a	genealogy	of	truthfulness	as opposed 
to	truth.6	The	reading	I	offer	in	this	section	splits	the	difference:	it	pres-
ents	Truth and Truthfulness	 as	 a	 genealogical	 explanation	of	why	we	
might	have	come	to	value	truth	intrinsically,	where	this	means	valuing	
the	various	states	and	activities	expressive	of	truthfulness	intrinsically.






basic	 role	 in	 language	 and	 thought.7	This	 role	 “is	 always	 and	every-
where	the	same”	(TT	61,	271).	Truth	is	a	formal	concept	that	we	cannot	
5.	 Blackburn	(2002)	and	Mordacci	(2016).
6.	 This	emphasis	on	truthfulness	as opposed to	truth	is	found	in	Honderich	(2003,	
140),	Hacking	(2004,	157),	Elgin	(2005,	67),	and	Koopman	(2013).
7.	 Koopman	ascribes	to	Williams	the	view	that	“the	truth	itself”	does	“not	vary	
with	 history”	 (2013,	 69).	 But	Williams	 only	 takes	 the	 concept of truth to be 
historically invariable; the	truth	itself	will	be	the	truth	about	a	matter	to	hand,	
and	as	historically	variable	as	the	matter	itself	(see	TT	257).
functionality:	 the	phenomenon	whereby	 a	 practice	 is	 functional,	 but	




tist	—	notwithstanding	 the	 fact	 that	 ‘the	 pragmatists’	 is	 the	 label	 he	
gives	 to	 his	 opponents.	 Williams’s	 genealogy	 merits	 the	 label	 of	 a	
‘pragmatic	 genealogy’	 in	 two	 respects:	 it	 focuses	 on	 the	 practices	 re-




to	Richard	Rorty’s	question:	Why	 should	we	value	 the	 truth?	While	
Rorty	 concludes	 that	we	are	better	off	dropping	 the	notion	of	 truth	
altogether,4	Williams’s	genealogy	offers	a	contrary	answer	by	display-











we	can	abandon	our	concern	 for	 it,	and	 this	 is	why	he	eschews	 the	
question	of	what	truth	is	for	the	question	of	why we	should	cultivate	
truthfulness.	In	§2,	I	argue	that	Williams’s	genealogical	method	is	best	
3.	 Blackburn	 (2002)	 and	Mordacci	 (2016)	 present	 it	 as	 a	 genealogy	 of	 truth,	
while	Honderich	 (2003,	 140),	Hacking	 (2004,	 140),	 Elgin	 (2005,	 344),	 and	
Koopman	(2013)	insist	that	it	is	a	genealogy	of	truthfulness	as opposed to truth.	
The	reading	I	offer	splits	the	difference.
4.	 See	especially	Rorty	and	Engel	(2007)	and	Rorty	(1998),	but	also	(1989,	1991).
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If	viewing	 the	concept	of	 truth	as	 fundamental	does	not	bar	Wil-



























ing	 that	 things	are	 thus-and-so,	and	 therefore	 to	understanding	any	
kind	of	variation	 in	 such	believings	or	 sayings.	 In	 recognising	 some-
thing	as	a	representation	of	things	as	being	thus-and-so,	we	are	always	
already	relying	on	the	concept	of	truth	in	this	basic	role.	


















even	where	we	find	 it	barely	 intelligible	 that	 there	 could	have	been	
a	development	towards	X.9	There	is	thus	nothing	here	to	prevent	us	
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of	incomprehension.	The	answer	only	begins	to	make	sense	once	we	
clarify	 that	we	 like	 to	 know	what	 people	 are	 talking	 about.	 Similar-
ly,	Williams	thinks	that	when	we	say	that	we	value	truth	intrinsically,	
what	we	mean	is	that	we	value	expressions	of	truthfulness	in	the	broad	

















only	 certain	human	attitudes	 toward	 the	 truth,	people’s	








































metalinguistic	 categories.	 If	we	were	 asked	 to	 list	 all	 the	 things	we	
value	intrinsically,	answering	“reference”	would	provoke	blank	stares	























“a	 fictional	 story	which	 represents	 a	 new	 reason	 for	 action	 as	 being	
developed	in	a	simplified	situation	as	a	function	of	motives,	reactions,	


























fulness	possesses	for	creatures	like	us.	It	refers	to	the	practical value of 
our valuing the	truth,	 i.e.,	 the	practical	value	of	 truthfulness	(e.g.,	TT 
15).
With	these	clarifications	in	place,	we	can	state	precisely	what	Wil-
liams’s	genealogy	 is	 a	genealogy	of.	 It	 is	 a	genealogical	explanation	
of	why	we	might	have	come	to	value	truth	intrinsically	—	where	this	
means	valuing	the	various	states	and	activities	expressive	of	truthful-














tural	 insights	 to	 look,	 as	Williams	 does,	 for	 the	 historical	moments	
around	which	truthfulness	came	to	be	extended	to	the	distant	past,	or	
when	it	grew	into	a	demand	for	authenticity.
Genealogies	have	 to	 start	 somewhere,	 and	 in	doing	 so	 they	will	









tion	about	 the	environment,	 its	 risks,	 and	 its	opportunities	 (TT	 58);	
but	already	the	sheer	fact	that	they	are	in	different	places	at	different	
times	means	 that	 there	are	 strong	pragmatic	pressures	on	 them	not	
just	to	rely	on	their	senses	in	acquiring	it,	but	to	cooperate,	in	particu-





accuracy	 and	 sincerity	need	 to	 come	 to	be	 regarded	 as	 traits	worth	






























in	 the	 first	 instance,	 to	 identify	 the	historical	 origins	 of	 truthfulness,	
but	to	identify	its	structural	origins.	It	serves	to	localise	and	bring	out	
the	function	of	the	virtues	of	truth	relative	to	certain	contingent	facts	
about	 human	 beings	 and	 their	 environment.	 It	 contributes	 to	what	
Williams	elsewhere	calls	a	“structural	description”	(1997b,	24)	of	truth-
fulness	and	its	roots	in	certain	basic	needs.	It	is	only	in	a	second	step	






prototype	helps	us	 identify	different	 instantiations	of	 truthfulness	 in	
the	historical	record.	The	same	structural	insights	also	indicate	which	
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himself.17	As	Williams’s	subtitle	acknowledges,	his	genealogical	meth-







grounds	 that	 place	 him	 squarely	 among	 the	 latter	—	not	 merely	 be-
cause	he	 affirms	 truth,	 but	 because	his	 approach	 to	 it	 is	 pragmatist	
in	 all	 but	 name.	 A	 truth-affirming	 pragmatist	 strives	 “to	 illuminate	















true	 information”	 (TT	 126).	Williams’s	genealogy	can	 thus	be	under-
stood	without	distortion	as	a	pragmatic genealogy	—	an	explanation	












embodied,	 extended	 and	 so	 on	 by	 historical	 experience”	 (Williams	
2007,	132).	This	is	the	reason	why	the	perspicuous	representation	of	
what	truthfulness	does	for	us	needs	to	be	enriched	with	historical	and	




















Peirce	 to	 Ramsey,	Wittgenstein,	 E.	J.	 Craig,	 and,	 I	 submit,	 Williams	
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[…]	 in	 the	 sense	 that	we	 can	 understand	 it	 and	 at	 the	
same	time	respect	it,	support	it	and	live	within	it.	We	can	
also	 urge	 it	 against	 alternative	 creeds	 whose	 own	 self-
understandings	 (as	 divine	 revelations,	 for	 instance)	 are	
themselves	 not	 going	 to	 survive	 a	 genealogical	 inquiry.	
(2014,	410)








3. McGinn’s Three Challenges and Self-Effacing Functionality












(1)	The No Intrinsic Value Challenge:	“showing	the	function	
that	 a	 virtue	 serves	 can	only	 give	 it	 instrumental	 value,	
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necessity	—	a	matter	of	having	strong	instrumental	reasons	to	acquire	





















intrinsically	 is	not	enough	actually	 to	do	so.	But	 if	both	the	Practical 
Exigency	and	the	Conceptual and Affective Embeddedness	conditions	hold,
[…]	we	have	not	simply	adopted	an	illusion	or	a	pretence	
of	 there	 being	 an	 intrinsic	 good.	 In	 fact,	 if	 these	 condi-
tions	 hold,	 that	 would	 be	 a	 very	 odd	 thing	 to	 say,	 im-



















truthfulness	 intrinsic	 value	—	he	 is	 trying	 to	 vindicate	 the	 intrinsic	















But	he	 takes	 this	 to	be	 true	of	some	intrinsic	goods,	and	where	 this	
is	the	case,	realising	it	will	help	explain	why	they	are	intrinsic	goods.	
Furthermore,	 the	 necessity	 at	 issue	 in	 the	 first	 condition	 is	practical 
22. TT	92;	also	Williams	(2006b,	ch.	8).







(this	 is	 not	 to	 identify	 intrinsic	 goodness	with	 final	 goodness:	 some	
things,	 like	natural	 beauty	 and	works	of	 art,	 are	 valued	 intrinsically	
without	 being	pursued	 as	 ends	 [2006a,	 135–6]).	Hence,	 “something	
is	 intrinsically	good	 if	we	need	 to	value	 it	as	 intrinsically	good,	and	
we	can	make	sense	of	our	doing	so”	(2006a,	136).	This	just	is	for	it	to	
fulfil	 the	Practical Exigency	 and	Conceptual and Affective Embeddedness 
conditions.	
The	 core	 of	 the	 answer	 to	McGinn’s	 first	 challenge,	 then,	 is	 that	
functionality	is	not	supposed	to	give	truthfulness	intrinsic	value,	but	









The	 book	 thereby	 pursues	 a	wider	 concern	—	to	 show	 that,	 in	 a	
seeming	 paradox,	 “intrinsic	 values	 […]	 have	 their	 uses”	 (TT	 127).	










The	mistake	of	describing	Williams	as	holding	 that	we	 should	 treat	




In	order	better	to	grasp	this	 line	of	 thought,	 it	helps	to	step	back	
from	his	genealogy	for	a	moment	to	understand	the	conception	of	in-
trinsic	value	in	relation	to	which	Williams	develops	his	own,	which	is	
Christine	Korsgaard’s.	Korsgaard	 contrasts	 “intrinsic”	with	 “extrinsic”	
on	the	one	hand,	and	“final”	with	“instrumental”	on	the	other	(1996,	
249).	She	maintains	that	these	are	different	contrasts	between	differ-
ent	 classes	of	 things.	 For	Williams,	however,	 it	 is	only	 the	 intrinsic/
extrinsic	contrast	which	captures	a	difference	between	things,	namely	
those	which	have	 their	value	 in	 themselves	and	those	which	derive	
it	from	something	else;	the	final/instrumental	contrast	distinguishes	
ways in	which	we	value	things,	namely	as	means	or	as	ends.





not	mean	 that	we	 value	 it	 only	 as	 a	means	 (2006a,	 122–3).	 Second,	
“intrinsic	goodness”	as	it	occurs	in	the	intrinsic/extrinsic	contrast	is	a	
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Let	 us	 now	 turn	 to	 McGinn’s	 second	 challenge,	 that	 Williams’s	
functional	 story	constitutes	a	 thinly	disguised	 form	of	utilitarianism.	
This	need	not	be	problematic	in	itself,	but	it	would	be	a	problem	by	
Williams’s	own	lights,	since	the	form	of	utilitarianism	his	vindication	
most	 closely	 resembles	 is	 the	 indirect	 utilitarianism	 he	 himself	 im-
pugned	 as	 unstable	 under	 reflection.28	 Turning	Williams’s	 objection	
back	on	himself,	we	might	say	that	the	attempt	to	justify	the	disposi-
tion	to	value	truthfulness	intrinsically	on	purely	instrumental	grounds	
leads	 to	 a	 tension	between	 the	 spirit being justified	 and	 the	 spirit jus-

























for whom?	Williams’s	genealogy	yields	pragmatic	 reasons,	 individual	
and	collective,	to	cultivate	the	virtues	of	truthfulness,	and	shows	why,	
beyond	a	certain	critical	mass,	communication	will	not	survive	failure	





















a	 limiting	case	of	reasons	 internalism	(1995c,	220n3).	 In	seeking	to	ground	
his	derivation	of	the	need	for	truthfulness	in	maximally	widely	shared	needs,	
Williams’s	 genealogy	 likewise	 constitutes	 a	 limiting	 case	 of	 internalism.	
Thanks	to	A.	W.	Moore	for	the	pointer.
27.	 See	Queloz	(2018)	for	further	discussion.







































(2′),	 there	 is	no	 longer	a	contradiction,	 since	 the	 instrumental	value	
ascribed	is	not	exclusive.	The	recognition	of	 instrumental	value	coex-
ists	harmoniously	with	that	of intrinsic	value.
Another	difference	 is	 that	while	Williams	offers	a	 two-level	view	
that	 is	structurally	similar	to	indirect	utilitarianism,	the	repartition	of	
the	 justificatory weight	across	the	two	levels	of	the	utilitarian,	(1)	and	





























practice’s	 functionality,	 the	attempt	 to	explain	 the	practice	 in	purely	
functional	terms	will	appear	to	distort	the	practice,	to	mistake	it	for	a	








tionality	of	 truthfulness	 cannot	be	 accounted	 for	 in	purely	 function-
al	 terms.	 Instrumental	motives	 for	 being	 truthful	 cannot	 render	 the	
practice	stable	enough	to	fulfil	its	function:	the	instrumental	value	of	




















constitutes	a	new reason for action,	and	that	this	must	be	so	if	the	prac-
tice	 is	 to	 be	 functional.	 By	 focusing	only	 on	 the	 instrumental	 value,	




has	acquired	 in	 the	course	of	 its	history.	Cultural	variation	between	
groups	and	cultures	 implies	 that	 even	 if	 certain	 functional	 relations	
were	 the	 same	across	 these	variations,	 truthfulness	would	neverthe-
less	 also	 have	 been	 shaped	by	 different	 contingencies	 in	 each	 case.	
What	truthfulness	needs	to	be	is	only	a	very	partial	guide	to	what	it	
actually	is.
Can	the	pure	 functionalist	not	shrug	 this	off	by	saying	 that	he	 is	
simply	not	interested	in	these	non-functional	aspects?	I	think	not,	be-
cause	I	take	Williams’s	claim	to	be	that	the	non-functional	aspects	of	
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has	 in	 fact	outgrown	the	purely	 instrumental	prototype.	We	can	call	
this	the	phenomenon	of	self-effacing functionality:
Self-Effacing Functionality:
The	 practice	 is	 functional,	 but	 only	 insofar	 as	 it	 is	 sus-
tained	by	motives	that	are	autonomous,	i.e.	not	condition-










(b)	Autonomy:	 the	 practice	 is	 sustained	 by	motives	 that	
are	not	conditional	on	its	functionality	in	any	given	case;







We	 can	 call	 this	 the	 FADE	 structure:	 Functionality,	 Autonomy,	 De-










for	 action	 to	 other	 reasons	 for	 action	which	 […]	we	 have	 ‘anyway’”	
(Williams	2000,	160)	—	but	while	the	relation	between	them	is	an	in-
strumental	 relation,	 the	 reasons	 for	 action	 are	 not	 instrumental	 rea-
sons.	It	is	by	being	“bloody-minded	rather	than	benefit-minded”	(TT 
59)	 that	we	 reap	 the	benefits,	and	 the	genealogy	helps	explain	why	
this	must	be	so.
This	puts	even	more	distance	between	Williams’s	genealogy	and	
the	problem	of	 reflective	 instability.	The	genealogical	 account	finds	





This	 is	why	we	 should	opt	 for	 genealogy	 in	 the	 form	of	 (ii),	 the	
application	of	the	purely	functional	apparatus	to	an	abstract	model	of	
truthfulness,	if	we	are	neither	to	overemphasise	nor	to	overlook	func-






33. Craig’s	 reading	 of	Williams,	 by	 contrast,	 seems	 to	 retain	 the	 idea	 of	 “func-
tional	motivations”	(2007,	200).





history?	On	 the	 interpretation	offered	here,	 it	 is	 required	because	a 
priori reflection	can	take	us	only	so	far:	from	highly	general	demands	
on	human	beings	 to	a	 schematic	understanding	of	what	 is	 required	
to	meet	these	demands;	but	to	cover	the	remaining	distance	between	
what	should	be	the	case	and	what	is	actually	the	case,	we	need	to	take	




truthfulness.	Moreover,	 these	 ideas	 are	 the	 products	 of	 various	 his-
torical	forces,	and	their	contingent	historical	extensions	and	elabora-
tions	cannot	be	anticipated	a priori.	Generic	needs	cannot	account	for	























Critical	Theory,	where	awareness	of	a	practice’s	 functionality	 is	 radi-




for	 engaging	 in	 it.	This	need	not	mean	 that	becoming	aware	of	 the	
instrumental	motives	for	engaging	in	the	practice	has	a	destabilising	





functionality	 from	practices	which	 fulfil	 conditions	 (a)	 and	 (b)	 only	
because	the	participants	fail	to	realise	the	practice’s	functionality	and	
engage	 in	 it	 because	 they	 have	 been	 taught	 to	 do	 so.	 It	 also	 distin-
guishes	 it	 from	practices	which	 fulfil	 conditions	 (a)	 and	 (b)	 and	do	
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which	allow	us	to	answer	distinctively	philosophical	concerns	about	
truthfulness:	What	 is	 the	 point	 of	 truthfulness?	 How	 does	 it	 relate	




clearly	 those	of	philosophy	before	 they	are	 those	of	any	other	disci-
pline;	and	as	Williams	learned	from	Collingwood,	our	understanding	
of	the	questions	should	guide	our	understanding	of	the	answers.36
Conclusion: The Wider Significance of Williams’s Genealogy










































ing,	 in	 the	 form	of	(ii)	and	(iii),	 the	products	of	different	disciplines,	
such	as	game	theory	and	historiography.	This	would	rightly	invite	con-
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genealogical	 reflection,	 giving	 it	 a	 bill	 of	 health.	 Yet	 it	 derives	 addi-
tional	significance	from	two	further	facts.
One	is	 that	truthfulness	 is	a	thick concept	—	a	concept	that	 is	both	
world-guided	and	action-guiding.	Thick	concepts	offer	both	more	and	
less	 stability	 than	 thin	 ones	 like	 good	 and	 right.	 They	 offer	more	 sta-
bility	 insofar	as	 they	help	stabilise	 the	practice	 they	are	 involved	 in	
by	rendering	judgements	straightforwardly	true	(2011,	222).	Yet	thick	
concepts	also	offer	less	stability	insofar	as	they	are	particularly	liable	
to	 be	 unseated	 by	 reflection.	 Reflecting	 on	 a	 thick	 concept,	we	 are	
more	likely	to	find	considerations	that	lead	us	to	cease	to	live	by	that	




















basis	 from	which	 to	 engage	 in	 genealogical	 reflection	more	widely;	
37. Nietzsche	(1998,	III,	§27).	But	even	Nietzsche	does	not	think	we	should	give	





necessity	of	having	 those	dispositions	 to	 the	beliefs	 involved	 in hav-
ing	 those	dispositions.	The	beliefs	 involved	 in	having	 these	disposi-
tions	are	not	typically	beliefs	about	dispositions,	but	about	the	social	
world.	Yet	such	a	genealogy	can	show	us	that	there	is	good	reason	for	
us	 to	 live	a	 life	 that	 involves	certain	conceptual	and	evaluative	prac-
tices.	It	does	not	demonstrate	the	truth	of	statements	made	using	these	







tral	 convictions:	 that	we	should	aim	 for	 truthful	 self-understanding;	
but	that	our	ideas	are	unlikely	always	to	survive	truthful	scrutiny.	Wil-
liams	holds	that	ethical	thought,	in	particular,	“should	stand	up	to	re-
flection”	 and	 “its	 institutions	 and	practices	 should	be	 capable	of	 be-
coming	transparent”	(2011,	222);	yet	he	is	also	inclined	to	agree	with	
Nietzsche’s	diagnosis	of	the	condition	of	modernity	as	“one	in	which	
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